Book Quote #1-The Aftermath of the Battle of Rhode Island

Howe was moving away with the French in hot pursuit. Both admirals were jockeying for position, trying to get windward of the other in order to initiate battle. Howe was increasing his distance from the French, when crews began to notice a change in the weather. The seas were now choppier, and in the distance the skies began to darken. Winds began to whip. As each side began to form for battle, a storm was upon them. For two days, heavy wind and rain pounded the fleets, and thick fog decreased visibility to such an extent that neither fleet was visible to the other. The French fleet was battered. D’Estaing’s flagship, Languedoc, was severely damaged, losing its bowsprit, rudder, and all of its masts. The 80-gun Tonnant and the 74-gun Marseillais lost two of their three masts. The weather was so bad that repairs could not be made at sea as damaged rigging, sails, and even cannonballs were strewn across the decks of the now crippled ships. Back at Newport, the storm had devastating effects on the inhabitants and soldiers. Mary Almy’s diary indicated that “the wind blew a perfect hurricane, and it never rained harder since the flood.” Sullivan indicated that the storm was “so violent that it . . . blew down tore, and almost irreparably ruined the few tents my troops had in their possession. The arms were rendered unfit for immediate use and almost the whole of the ammunition damaged.” Sullivan’s men were reduced to “the superiority of our numbers and the length of our Bayonets.” Major Mackenzie noted in his diary that the inhabitants had not seen a storm of this severity in three or four years, but he also mentioned how the storm would affect the enemy. “One favorable consequence attending this Storm is, that it will retard the Rebels greatly in bring in bringing forward the Cannon, Stores, provisions, and other requisites for a siege,” he wrote. “Their troops must also suffer from the inclemency of the weather, & being ill provided with Clothing, Blankets and tents, they will be apt to grow sickly and discontented.” It was clear that unpredictable weather was a strategic variable that shaped the campaign.

Finally, on August 20, over a week since the great storm, the sight of French sails on the horizon renewed spirit in the American army. Howe’s fleet was severely damaged as well, and they sailed for the safety of New York for repairs and refitting.  That afternoon, Joseph Comte de Cambis, the commander of the Senegal, came ashore near Point Judith to confer with American officers regarding the latest news from d’Estaing. DeCambis delivered the devastating announcement. D’Estaing informed Sullivan that due to the effects of the storm on his ships, he was to “put into port for repairs, to enable him to continue his operations against our common enemy. In consequence, Sir, the French fleet will approach no nearer to Rhode Island but will go to Boston.” Responses to the French withdrawal were immediate. Nathanael Greene replied the next day. “The expedition against Rhode [Aquidneck] Island was undertaken upon no other consideration than that of French fleet and troops acting in conjunction with the American troops,” wrote Greene. “There has been great expense and much distress brought upon the Country in calling the Militia together” and with sufficient force now gathered for the reduction of Newport, “if the expedition fails for want of the countenance of the Fleet and Troops on board, it will produce great discontent and murmuring among the people.” Greene tried to employ flattery later in his letter to avoid a rupture with the Count, hoping that “any little indiscretions on our part as to personal attention in the conducting of the present expedition, that the greatness of your Excellency . . . will pass as too trifling to be brought in competition with our great natural interest.”

        Sullivan, on the other hand, reacted sharply and penned “A Protest of the General Officers on Rhode Island,” in which he listed nine points as to why the French should have remained in Rhode Island. These points, according to Sullivan, were “contrary to the Intention of his most Christian Majesty and the Interest of his nation and destruction in the highest degree to the welfare of the United States of America, and highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations.” This letter was widely circulated, and such a public denunciation of the French threatened an already challenged alliance. On August 26, Sullivan correctly retracted his statements when he realized that he had erred, failing to follow Washington’s advice to create “harmony and good agreement” with the French.   Lafayette was equally frustrated, knowing that the removal of the French fleet had cost the Americans dearly, thus depriving him of a chance at military glory. He admitted to d’Estaing that “the general consternation was more extensive than I would have ever believed,” he wrote. He lamented that “it was impossible to foresee the effect this departure” had on the campaign.