Book quote #4-Mounting Tensions in the South

The situation in Charleston was worrisome. Washington could see British movements eroding any defenses the Americans could muster. Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens confirmed that the British were going to “attack Charles Town by a siege in form” and that in order to complete the investiture of the city, “he must introduce his Ships of war into the harbor.” The Americans could not contest the British entry into the harbor, so it meant “a great diminution of our means of defense.” On the morning of March 20, Charleston schoolteacher Samuel Baldwin noted in his journal that “the English ships came over the bar without meeting any accidents. . . . With the evening tide a 64-gun ship came safely over, contrary to the expectations of everybody,” and with that, Baldwin noted, “the force of the enemy was now become so superior that it was thought our shipping could not be able to withstand them.” 

In light of these developments, Greene, still the Quarter Master General, questioned “whether any further succours ought to go from this army” to the South. He also prodded Washington about “our prospects for moving the army this campaign.” Raiding parties originating from Staten Island and north of New York City had probed into the region east of Morristown, but primarily in Bergen County, in the northern part of the state, some of the engagements were becoming rather intense. “The movements of the Enemy may soon make it necessary to put our whole force in motion,” he wrote, and “I wish to know therefore what provision is made and making of covering in camp-equipage & means of transportation; and how soon we may expect to be in a condition to take the field.” But Washington was hyper-focused on affairs to the South. “The situation of our affairs in South Carolina impresses me with many fears,” he wrote to Greene, “on acct of Charles Town & with deep concern at the effect which the loss of it may produce on the minds of the people in that quarter.” Washington decided, however, to call a council of war to discuss the matter fully with his generals.

            On March 27, after describing the military situation to the council regarding Charleston, Washington stated the current status of the army. “Our operating force at this Post [Morristown] amounts to about 7000 rank and file . . . at the Highlands about 2600 . . . and at Danbury about 800.” Approximately 2,800 would be leaving the service. He discussed the issues with the commissary and quartermaster departments, and given the current situation with provisions, Washington felt “it will be impracticable for some time to put the army in motion if it were necessary.” Washington estimated that British forces in New York at about 11,000. He then requested their opinions in writing as to “whether any further force can at this time be spared from here to reinforce that in South Carolina, whether it will be advisable to make such a detachment and to what amount; also in case of a detachment should be made, what disposition ought to take place of the remaining force.” Over the next several days, Washington’s officers responded. The answers were predictable. “Inconsistent with the public good” was one response; “no Troops can be spared” read another. Washington did decide, however, to detach Major Henry Lee’s corps to South Carolina and wrote the Board of War with a request to equip them for the long march. The opening of a new British front left Washington in a predicament. With the French absent, and his troops spread too thin already, he had effectively relinquished control of events.