Book Quote #5-The Invasion of New Jersey, First Encounter, June 7, 1780

` According to Lieutenant Johann Prechtel of the Ansbach-Bayreuth contingent, the British and Hessian expedition “sailed over to Staten Island in flatboats and schooners and made night camp at Decker’s Ferry” on the night of June 6. At about midnight, they came ashore at DeHart’s landing near Elizabethtown and quietly began marching inland. For the time being, the element of surprise was with them. After about an hour’s march, suddenly the sound of musket fire filled the air. A small band of Continentals encountered the British and Hessian columns at 1 a.m. and when shots rang out, British General Stirling was found to have been hit in the leg by a musket ball. The columns came crashing to a halt. Captain Jonathan Dayton of the 3rd New Jersey and his men had stunned the British momentarily. The British advance now lost the element of surprise, and Dayton wrote a note to Washington informing him of this incursion at 4 a.m.  Three hours later, Washington sent six brigades toward Chatham, New Jersey. His troops totaled about 4,200 men, not enough to take on the juggernaut of 6,000 moving toward him. Washington quickly wrote to General Lord Stirling to call out the militia and move quickly to Chatham. The initial defending force was composed of Brigadier General William Maxwell’s 741 men in the New Jersey brigades, 150 members of Washington’s Life Guards, and about 360 militiamen. Maxwell ordered a few small parties from his brigade to harass the enemy’s advance, and over the course of the night and early morning hours, his brigades had held up the British columns for three hours. But as the enemy gathered in strength, Maxwell was forced to retreat toward the heights near Springfield. Before daylight, though, signal beacons in the Watchungs were burning, an indicator to the New Jersey militia to gather and to warn civilians that danger was lurking ahead.

            The residents of Connecticut Farms (now Union, New Jersey) began to fear for their safety and for their homes and material possessions.  The village consisted of a Presbyterian church, eight or ten houses, and a small assortment of stores and shops. It was only four miles west of Elizabethtown and was directly in the path of Knyphausen if he were to push through Hobart Gap and possibly beyond to Morristown. Initially, the British and Hessians marched toward Connecticut Farms with little opposition. Then suddenly, that all changed. Militia streamed onto the scene of the march, growing with each passing minute. Fighting behind stone walls, trees, buildings, or whatever cover they could find, they continually harassed the column until it arrived in Connecticut Farms around 8 a.m. Knyphausen’s plan was falling apart. “I found the disposition of the inhabitants by no means such I expected,” wrote Knyphausen, “on the contrary they were everywhere in arms, nor did I find that spirit of desertion amongst their troops, which it was represented to me existed among them.” It was here that hope of a rapid movement died. At Connecticut Farms, Knyphausen lost control of his troops. German and British troops began breaking into homes, causing wanton damage and looting.

Meanwhile, Washington had arrived with the main army from Morristown and occupied the strong post of Short Hills. Although Knyphausen had advanced and moved the Americans out of the way, there came a point that it was no longer plausible to advance any further.  “The more we advanced the more it was realized that Washington was always ready to reduce our still remaining advantage,” wrote Hessian Carl Leopold Baurmeister in his diary. Knyphausen had also received word that Henry Clinton would be at Sandy Hook in a few days. Knyphausen ordered a withdrawal that evening, but not before they put Connecticut Farms to the torch. According to one account, “they set fire to and entirely destroyed the Presbyterian church, and 14 dwelling houses and barns, so that there are . . . but two dwelling houses remaining in that fertile settlement. But, alas . . . this is only one part of the horrid scene.” Another account said “The buildings were first given up to pillage—thoroughly ransacked, and everything portable carried off. They were then fired and burnt down.” As the British and Hessians made their way back toward Elizabethtown and into the safe confines of New York, both sides took stock of the battle. American casualties were relatively small, approximately 15 killed and 40 wounded.  Knyphausen reported 11 killed, 145 wounded, and 37 missing.  From the British perspective, the expedition was a failure. Not only had Knyphausen’s army suffered high casualties, but the razing of Connecticut Farms and the killing of Hannah Caldwell further spurred thoughts of independence and incensed the inhabitants of eastern New Jersey. Knyphausen gained nothing. Henry Clinton wrote that he “ had the mortification to hear by a frigate . . . that Generals Knyphausen and Robertson had already entered the Jersies with a considerable part of the New York force.” He considered the expedition an “ill-timed malapropos move . . . which General Knyphausen informed me, was undertaken on the ill-founded suggestions of [a] American Governor and some other over-sanguine refugees whose zeal (I am free to say) has but often out-run their prudence in the course of this unfortunate war.”  The day was an overwhelming success for the Americans, a moral victory and a confidence-booster.  Brigadier General Maxwell summed it up best: “Never did troops, either continental or militia, behave better than ours did. Everyone that had an opportunity (which they mostly all had) vied with each other who could serve the country best.”